The system-wide mean score barely moved (−0.2 pts), but the 1st-percentile score dropped 11 points (79.96 → 69.00) while the median fell just 0.08 pts. This is not a broad system-wide deterioration, it is a sharp, concentrated deterioration in the most vulnerable segment of the industry. 86 banks crossed into at-risk territory (Score < 90) for the first time, while only 14 improved enough to exit.
The primary drivers are capital compression (median Tier 1 ratio −1.04 pp) and sharply slowing asset growth (−3.04 pp). Paradoxically, earnings metrics actually improved quarter-over-quarter, suggesting banks are earning more but facing balance-sheet and capitalization pressures regardless.
| Risk Tier | Score Range | Q2 Count | Q2 Share | Q3 Count | Q3 Share | Change | % Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH RISK TIERS | |||||||
| Extreme Risk | 0–20 | 4 | 0.09% | 6 | 0.14% | +2 | +50% |
| Very High Risk | 20–40 | 5 | 0.12% | 8 | 0.19% | +3 | +60% |
| High Risk | 40–60 | 9 | 0.21% | 16 | 0.37% | +7 | +78% |
| Elevated Risk | 60–80 | 26 | 0.61% | 52 | 1.22% | +26 | +100% |
| MODERATE RISK | |||||||
| Moderate Risk | 80–90 | 76 | 1.77% | 107 | 2.51% | +31 | +41% |
| LOW RISK | |||||||
| Low Risk | 90–100 | 4,176 | 97.2% | 4,078 | 95.6% | −98 | −2.3% |
| Total Banks | — | 4,296 | 100% | 4,267 | 100% | −29 | charters |
Earnings metrics (ROA, ROE, NIM) all moved in the right direction between Q2 and Q3, with NIM expanding significantly (+0.88 pp). Yet capital ratios fell, reserve coverage declined, and asset growth decelerated sharply. This combination of profitable but capital-constrained and slowing growth is the signature of an industry under balance-sheet pressure even as the income statement looks decent.
The model responds primarily to capital and growth signals, which explains why rising NIM didn't offset the risk increase.
| Metric (Median, All Banks) | Q2 2026 | Q3 2026 | Change | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPITAL ADEQUACY | ||||
| Tier 1 Capital Ratio | 11.64% | 10.60% | −1.04 pp | ↓ Worse |
| ASSET QUALITY | ||||
| Non-Performing Loans / Total Loans | 0.432% | 0.448% | +0.016 pp | ↓ Worse |
| Loan Loss Reserves / Total Loans | 1.199% | 1.065% | −0.134 pp | ↓ Worse |
| MANAGEMENT / EFFICIENCY | ||||
| Efficiency Ratio | 67.22% | 66.59% | −0.63 pp | ↑ Better |
| EARNINGS | ||||
| Return on Assets (ROA) | 0.608% | 0.660% | +0.052 pp | ↑ Better |
| Return on Equity (ROE) | 6.70% | 7.42% | +0.72 pp | ↑ Better |
| Net Interest Margin (NIM) | 3.07% | 3.95% | +0.88 pp | ↑ Better |
| LIQUIDITY | ||||
| Loans / Deposits (Loan-to-Deposit Ratio) | 70.26% | 68.12% | −2.14 pp | ↑ Better |
| SENSITIVITY / GROWTH | ||||
| Asset Growth (YoY) | 5.02% | 1.98% | −3.04 pp | ↓ Worse |
| Loan Growth (YoY) | 3.65% | 2.42% | −1.23 pp | ↓ Worse |
| Deposit Growth (YoY) | 3.18% | 1.76% | −1.42 pp | ↓ Worse |
| Core Deposit Growth (YoY) | 2.91% | 1.54% | −1.37 pp | ↓ Worse |
86 banks crossed into at-risk territory (Score < 90) between Q2 and Q3, primarily entering the Moderate (80–90) bucket. The score bucket 85–90 alone absorbed 73 newly deteriorating banks (+24 net). These are borderline cases. That is, these banks not in deep distress, but the movement is meaningful enough to flag. Only 14 banks improved sufficiently to exit at-risk status, yielding a net increase of 69 (the total at-risk count rose by 69 from 120 to 189).
The worst deteriorators (Extreme, Very High tiers) represent distinct idiosyncratic situations (i.e., institution-specific shocks rather than a systemic pattern). The systemic story is concentrated in the Elevated tier doubling (26→52) and the Moderate tier growing by 41%.
The 1.04 pp decline in median Tier 1 capital ratios in a single quarter is striking. Banks can lose capital ratios through three mechanisms: (1) loan losses exceeding reserves, (2) dividend/buyback distribution exceeding earnings, or (3) rapid balance sheet expansion diluting ratios before retained earnings catch up. With NPL ratios rising modestly and earnings improving, mechanism (3) is the most likely culprit, even as growth itself is slowing. This may reflect prior-quarter expansion still being absorbed.
The reserve coverage decline (1.199% → 1.065%) is a secondary concern. While coverage ratios above 1% remain adequate, a 13 bp decline suggests banks are releasing reserves faster than NPLs warrant, possibly in response to earnings pressure. This leaves less buffer for the inevitable loan deterioration cycle.
The Elevated tier (Score 60–80) doubled from 26 to 52 banks in one quarter. Historically, Elevated-tier banks face meaningfully higher actual failure rates over the subsequent 4–6 quarters than the broader population. This tier represents the pipeline for potential FDIC problem-bank designation. Monitor Q4 2026 closely: if the Elevated tier continues growing or if any current Elevated-tier banks slip into Very High/Extreme, the FDIC problem bank count will likely rise significantly in 2027.
The geographic and size distribution of newly at-risk banks would be worth looking into if the deterioration is concentrated in specific regions (e.g., commercial real estate-heavy markets) or size bands (community banks below $1B).
The +0.88 pp NIM expansion is the most significant single-metric improvement this quarter and reflects the lagged repricing benefit of the 2022–23 rate cycle finally flowing through bank income statements. This is real earnings power that improves banks' ability to build capital organically going forward. However, the underlying PennAnalytics models weight capital and growth features heavily. NIM alone is insufficient to offset capital ratio deterioration in the model's risk calculus. The model is correctly prioritizing balance-sheet integrity over income-statement optics.
At model retraining (Q4 2026 data, ~February 2027), we'll consider whether NIM's predictive weight should be revisited given the current rate environment.
The tier counts above reflect only banks that filed FFIEC Call Reports as of September 30, 2026. Banks that failed during Q3 exit the reporting population before the quarter-end cutoff and are therefore absent from the Q3 CSV entirely — they are not counted in any tier, including Extreme Risk. Four FDIC-insured institutions failed during Q3 2026:
| Bank | State | Closed | Last Scored | Last Score | Last Tier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kentland Federal S&L | IN | 10-Jul-26 | Q1 2026 | 18.09 | Extreme Risk |
| Small Business Bank | KS | 17-Jul-26 | Q1 2026 | 16.05 | Extreme Risk |
| Tioga-Franklin Savings Bank | PA | 21-Aug-26 | Q2 2026 | 3.70 | Extreme Risk |
| Nano Banc | CA | 25-Sep-26 | Q2 2026 | 35.32 | Very High Risk |
Three of the four carried Extreme Risk scores well below 20 in their final scored quarter. Nano Banc deteriorated rapidly from 64.71 (High Risk, Q1) to 35.32 (Very High Risk, Q2) before closing in September. The Q3 at-risk counts — and especially the Extreme Risk count of 6 — should therefore be read as a floor. Source: FDIC Failed Bank List, cross-referenced against FFIEC Call Report cert numbers.